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Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory

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Author Info
Stephen Morris
Hyun Song Shin

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Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number 97-8.

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Handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:97-8

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shin Hyun Song, 1993. "Logical Structure of Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-13, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
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  3. Stephen Morris, . ""Co-operation and Timing''," CARESS Working Papres 95-05, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi, 2003. "Reasoning About Knowledge," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262562006, January.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Shin, Hyun Song & Williamson, Timothy, 1996. "How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 252-268, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Geanakoplos, John, 1994. "Common knowledge," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 40, pages 1437-1496 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lismont, Luc & Mongin, Philippe, 1995. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 127-153, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Shin, Hyun Song, 1996. "Comparing the Robustness of Trading Systems to Higher-Order Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 39-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Efficient Communication in the Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 07-11, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Bernhard Winkler, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Aug 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Boris Salazar & María del Pilar Castillo, 2003. "Rationality, preferences and irregular war," COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL. [Downloadable!]
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1204, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Jutta Dönges & Frank Heinemann, 2001. "Competition for Order Flow as a Coordination Game," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 64, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Volz, Ulrich, 2005. "Pegs, Baskets, and the Importance of Policy Credibility: Lessons of the 1992-92 ERM Crisis," Discussion Paper Series 26238, Hamburg Institute of International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Frederic Koessler, 2000. "Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0887, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2004. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 4287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1260, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Uwe Dulleck, 2002. "The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning," Vienna Economics Papers 0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-1.

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