"Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited''
AbstractSuppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.
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- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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- Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006.
321307000000000355, UCLA Department of Economics.
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