Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
AbstractWe investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable and the signal for monitoring a player's action does not depend on the other player's action. Tit-for-tat strategies function very well in this class, according to which each player's action in each period depends only on the signal for the opponent's action one period before. With almost perfect monitoring, we show that even if the discount factors are fixed low, efficiency is approximated by a tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium payoff vector.
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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Other versions of this item:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CARF F-Series CARF-F-096, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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