Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
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