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Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited

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Harbord, David

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Abstract

We revisit Greif's (1993) analysis of trade between the 11th-century Maghribi traders and present two different models which bring into play, in an essential way, historical features of the Maghribi's organization which had no role in Greif's own analysis. Our reformulation of the Maghribi's "punishment strategies" incorporates principal components of their actual historical practice and explains why they may have been necessary to sustain cooperation, especially in the presence of uncertainty or imperfect information. We also model "formal friendships," or trade through bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and predict the Maghribi's practice of providing agency services without pecuniary compensation. We are thus able to provide a richer and more accurate picture of how that organization facilitated trade between widely-dispersed traders in the absence of a reliable legal system to enforce merchant contracts.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1889/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1889.

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Date of creation: 08 Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1889

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Related research
Keywords: cooperation enforcement trade institutions

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
N75 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Asia including Middle East
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-76, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Matthew Rabin., 1991. "Reneging and Renegotiation," Economics Working Papers 91-163, University of California at Berkeley.
  4. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gintis, Herbert, 2004. "Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 695-714, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Aramendia, Miguel & Larrea, Concepcion & Ruiz, Luis, 2005. "Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Baliga, Sandeep & Evans, Robert, 2000. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 159-176, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1293-1317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2008. "Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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