Coordination, compensation and the expansion of trade: The merchant guilds revisited
AbstractGreif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) argued that the ability of the merchant guilds to encourage trade expansion required an internal mechanism to enforce compliance to trade embargoes, otherwise credible incentives for "embargo breaking" would have rendered them ine¤ectual. We show that sustaining e¢ cient trade implied an ability of the guilds to restrict their membership but no internal enforcement mechanism was necessary. Our reformulation of the guilds´ strategies - based on the historical evidence - makes trade embargoes self-enforcing and allows us to provide a richer picture of how the guilds could have facilitated trade expansion by controlling merchant trading activities.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40992.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
medieval trade; coordination; guilds;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- N73 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harbord, David, 2006. "Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited," MPRA Paper 1889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dessi, Roberta & Ogilvie, Sheilagh, 2004. "The Political Economy of Merchant Guilds: Commitment or Collusion ?," IDEI Working Papers 278, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Aramendia, Miguel & Larrea, Concepcion & Ruiz, Luis, 2005. "Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-19, July.
- Ogilvie,Sheilagh, 2011.
"Institutions and European Trade,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521764179, Fall.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.