Truthful Implementation and Preference Aggregation in Restricted Domains
AbstractIn a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that allows elevation of pairs and study which of these conditions implies which others when the domain is flexible. We provide a generalization of the theorem of Roberts (1979) in restricted valuation domains. Flexibility holds (and the theorem is not vacuous) if the domain of valuation profiles is restricted to the space of continuous functions defined on a topological space, or the space of piecewise linear functions defined on an affine space, or the space of smooth functions defined on a compact differentiable man- ifold. Our results can be applied in both public and private goods allocation settings, with finite or infinite alternative sets.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia in its series Discussion Papers Series with number 459.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-05-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-02 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik, 2013.
"Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains,"
Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
- Debasis Mishra & Souvik Roy, 2011. "Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 11-15, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterji & Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu'alem & Noam Nisan & Arunava Sen, 2006. "Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1109-1132, 07.
- Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2012.
"Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 283-298.
- Debasis Mishra & Arunava Sen, 2010. "Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 10-03, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Joanne Roberts, 1999.
"Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution,"
jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
- Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2001. "House Allocation with Transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 329-355, October.
- Juan Carlos Carbajal & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2012. "Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence," Discussion Papers Series 458, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Randal Anderson).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.