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On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

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Author Info

  • Alex Gershkov
  • Jacob K. Goeree
  • Alexey Kushnir
  • Benny Moldovanu
  • Xianwen Shi

Abstract

We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to Gutmann et al. (Annals of Probability, 1991). We also show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed, or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 81 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 197-220

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:1:p:197-220

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
  2. Müller,Rudolf & Perea,Andrés & Wolf,Sascha, 2005. "Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir, 2011. "On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in a general class of social choice problems," ECON - Working Papers 021, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Müller,Rudolf & Perea,Andrés & Wolf,Sascha, 2005. "Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. “On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation,” A. Gershkov et al (2012)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2013-01-27 23:25:20
  2. “On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation,” A. Gershkov et al (2012)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2013-01-27 23:25:20
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Cited by:
  1. Debasis Mishra & Abdul Quadir, 2012. "Deterministic single object auctions with private values," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 12-06, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  2. Csapó Gergely & Müller Rudolf, 2012. "Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Kleiner, Andreas & Drexl, Moritz, 2013. "Collective Decision Making with Transferable Utilities," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. Farinha Luz, Vitor, 2013. "Surplus extraction with rich type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2749-2762.
  5. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Optimal Mechanism Design without Money," Working Papers tecipa-481, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  6. Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai, 2013. "Symmetric Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-486, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Blumrosen, Liad & Feldman, Michal, 2013. "Mechanism design with a restricted action space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 424-443.

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