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Non-bossy single object auctions

Author

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  • Debasis Mishra

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Abdul Quadir

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

We study deterministic single object auctions in the private values environment. We show that an allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) and non-bossy if and only if it is a strongly rationalizable allocation rule. With a mild continuity condition, we show that an allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a simple utility maximizer (with appropriate tie-breaking). All our characterizations extend the seminal result of Roberts (“Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences”, pp. 321–348, 1979) from the unrestricted domain to the restricted domain of single object auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Debasis Mishra & Abdul Quadir, 2014. "Non-bossy single object auctions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 93-110, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:2:y:2014:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0031-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0031-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 283-298.
    2. Thierry Marchant & Debasis Mishra, 2015. "Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 433-455, February.
    3. Conan Mukherjee, 2014. "Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 289-311, February.
    4. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & McLennan, Andrew & Tourky, Rabee, 2013. "Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1074-1101.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2008. "Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 469-490, December.
    6. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(4), pages 587-597.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-1520, September.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2016. "Non-bossiness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 665-696, October.
    2. Mishra, Debasis & Nath, Swaprava & Roy, Souvik, 2018. "Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 240-261.
    3. Thierry Marchant & Debasis Mishra, 2015. "Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 433-455, February.
    4. Swaprava Nath & Nath and Arunava Sen, 2014. "Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations," Discussion Papers 14-12, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 363-373, December.
    6. Conan Mukherjee, 2020. "On group strategyproof and optimal object allocation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 289-304, October.
    7. De, Parikshit & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2019. "Balanced implementability of sequencing rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 342-353.
    8. Mukherjee, Conan, 2015. "On Axioms Underlying Use of Reserve Price," Working Papers 2015:7, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 14 Apr 2015.

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