AbstractWe study the optimal dynamic torture scheme offered to an informed victim by a principal who cannot commit. We interpret the principal as the representative member of society (political leader, median voter etc.). We show that an arbitrarily long torture scheme is extremely costly to the principal, however great is the information held by the victim. Increasing the intensity of torture makes the principal worse off if the torture scheme is long enough.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 661465000000000258.
Date of creation: 18 Oct 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Jeff Ely & Sandeep Baliga, 2010. "Torture," 2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
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