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Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias

Author

Listed:
  • David Martimort

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Lars Stole

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that consumers facing complex nonlinear prices often make choices based on average (not marginal) prices. Given such behavior, we characterize a monopolist's optimal nonlinear price schedule. In contrast to the textbook setting, nonlinear prices designed for "average-price bias" distort consumption downward for consumers with the highest marginal utility and typically feature quantity premia rather than quantity discounts. These properties arise because the bias replaces consumer information rents with "curvature rents." Whether or not a monopolist prefers consumers with average-price bias depends upon underlying preferences and costs.

Suggested Citation

  • David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2020. "Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias," Post-Print halshs-02973321, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02973321
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190272
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Diego Alejandro Murillo Taborda, 2021. "Nonlinear Pricing with Misspecified and Arbitrary Perception of the Marginal Price," Papers 2104.10281, arXiv.org.
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    4. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2022. "A Class of Behavioral Models for the Profit-Maximizing Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 9718, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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