By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners' dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma is often achieved, with 'reciprocal' preferences. In the chicken game a symmetric correlated strategy profile is played that is as efficient as the symmetric equilibrium. Among preferences only pure 'hawkish' preferences and 'selfish' preferences survive. With incomplete information, the symmetric equilibrium of the material payoff game is played. All types of preferences are present in the population in the medium run.
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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number
02-04.
Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 29 Jan 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:02-04
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. Contact details of provider: Postal: D-68131 Mannheim Phone: (49) (0) 621-292-2547 Fax: (49) (0) 621-292-5594 Email: Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/ More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004.
"Evolution of Preferences,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007.
"Equilibrium Vengeance,"
MPRA Paper
4321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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