This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in Symmetric Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Possajennikov, Alex () (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Agenst in a large population are randomly matched to play a material payoff game. They may have preferences that are different from the material payoffs. Agents learn equilibrium strategies according to their preferences before evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the material payoff game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the material payoff game can be stable. For 2x2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp02-03.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 02-03.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 28 Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:02-03

Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: D-68131 Mannheim
Phone: (49) (0) 621-292-2547
Fax: (49) (0) 621-292-5594
Email:
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/
More information through EDIRC

Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Carsten Schmidt).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 255-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ok, Efe A. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2001. "On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: An Incomplete Information Scenario," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 231-254, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(3), pages 637-679, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in 2x2 Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  7. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Bezalel Peleg, 2000. "Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 83-110, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Possajennikov, Alex, 2000. "On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 125-129, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Evolution of Preferences," Micro Theory Working Papers dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Possajennikov, Alex, 2002. "Cooperative Prisoners and Aggressive Chickens: Evolution of Strategies and Preferences in 2x2 Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-4.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.