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Evolution with diverse preferences

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  • Ely,J.C.
  • Sandholm,W.H.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 5.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20005

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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References

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  1. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  2. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  4. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
  5. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  7. Larry E. Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Working Papers 96-04-022, Santa Fe Institute.
  8. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 255-272, April.
  9. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  10. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  11. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Evolution and Mixed Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 200-226, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Potential dynamics and stable games," Working papers 21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  2. Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Bill Sandholm, 2003. "Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs," Vienna Economics Papers 0205, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

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