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Torture and the Commitment Problem

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  • Sandeep Baliga
  • Jeffrey C. Ely

Abstract

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that a standard rationale for torture generates two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a suspect he knows to be innocent. Secondly, the principal would benefit from a commitment to limit the amount of torture faced by the guilty. We analyse a dynamic model of torture in which the credibility of these threats and promises is endogenous. We show that these commitment problems dramatically reduce the value of torture and can even render it completely ineffective. We use our model to address questions such as the effect of enhanced interrogation techniques, rights against indefinite detention, and delegation of torture to specialists.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandeep Baliga & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2016. "Torture and the Commitment Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(4), pages 1406-1439.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:83:y:2016:i:4:p:1406-1439.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdv057
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Haibo, 2021. "A model of gradual information disclosure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 238-269.
    2. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. Mike Felgenhauer & Fangya Xu, 2021. "The Face Value Of Arguments With And Without Manipulation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 277-293, February.
    4. Selman Erol & Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, 2024. "Civil Liberties and Social Structure," Working Paper Series WP 2024-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2021. "Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 400-408.
    6. Kolb, Aaron & Conitzer, Vincent, 2020. "Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    7. Jack Fanning & Andrew Kloosterman, 2022. "An experimental test of the Coase conjecture: Fairness in dynamic bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 138-165, March.
    8. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
    9. Mike Felgenhauer & Petra Loerke, 2017. "Bayesian Persuasion With Private Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 829-856, August.
    10. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. repec:ema:worpap:2021-02_v2 is not listed on IDEAS

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