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Suspense and Surprise

Author

Listed:
  • Jeffrey Ely
  • Alexander Frankel
  • Emir Kamenica

Abstract

We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period's beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of mystery novels, political primaries, casinos, game shows, auctions, and sports.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Ely & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2015. "Suspense and Surprise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(1), pages 215-260.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/677350
    DOI: 10.1086/677350
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    References listed on IDEAS

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