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Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs

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  • George Loginov

Abstract

The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how, for a population of myopic agents with homogeneous preferences, changes in the environment caused by current aggregate behavior may affect future payoffs and hence alter future behavior. The interaction between the agents is based on a symmetric two-strategy game with positive externalities and negative feedback from aggregate behavior to payoffs, so that at every point in time the population has an incentive to coordinate, whereas over time the more popular strategy becomes less appealing. Under the best response dynamics and the logit dynamics with small noise levels the joint trajectories of preferences and behavior converge to closed orbits around the unique steady state, whereas for large noise levels the steady state of the logit dynamics becomes a sink. Under the replicator dynamics the unique steady state of the system is repelling and the trajectories are unbounded unstable spirals.

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  • George Loginov, 2021. "Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs," Papers 2106.08224, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2106.08224
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