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Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games

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  • Staudigl, Mathias

Abstract

A recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selection under noisy best-response dynamics. In this paper we present a complete picture of equilibrium selection for asymmetric binary choice coordination games in the small noise limit. We achieve this by transforming the stochastic stability analysis into an optimal control problem, which can be solved analytically. This approach allows us to obtain precise and clean equilibrium selection results for all canonical noisy best-response dynamics which have been proposed so far in the literature, among which we find the best-response with mutations dynamics, the logit dynamics and the probit dynamics.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 372-401

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:372-401

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Equilibrium selection;

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Cited by:
  1. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
  2. William H. Sandholm & Mathias Staudigl, 2014. "Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, I: Theory," Working Papers 505, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  3. William H. Sandholm & Mathias Staudigl, 2014. "Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, II: The Logit Model," Working Papers 506, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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