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Citations of
Winand Emons

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The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

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Working papers

  1. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  2. Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  3. Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    4. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Emons, Winand, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    5. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385. [Downloadable!]

  5. Winand Emons, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0315, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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    1. Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
      [Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]      ," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Tim Friehe, 2009. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 165-183, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. Emons, Winand, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    1. Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli, 2005. "Credible Criminal Enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 5-15, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?," Working papers 2009-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Winand Emons, . "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1005, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Tim Friehe, 2009. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 165-183, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment," Working papers 2009-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  7. Emons, Winand & Sheldon, George, 2002. "The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 3360, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    1. Peter Kooreman & Marco Haan, 2006. "Price Anomalies in the Used Car Market," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 41-62, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Anindya Ghose, 2005. "Used Good Trade Patterns: A Cross-Country Comparison of Electronic Secondary Markets," Working Papers 05-19, NET Institute, revised Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]

  8. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    2. Matthew Braham & Friedel Bolle, 2006. "A difficulty with oaths: On trust, trustworthiness, and signalling," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 219-232, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  9. Winand Emons, 2001. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Winand Emons, . "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1005, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
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    3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 11780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    4. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2008-44, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2006. "Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat Offenders," Serie Research Memoranda 0008, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, And Social Values," Working papers 2004-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    7. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2005. "Crime timing," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]

  10. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1008, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1117, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  11. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2005. "The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony," CEPR Discussion Papers 5124, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Robert Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1057, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures," Cahiers de recherche 0703, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Emons, Winand, 1998. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 2041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005. "Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods," Economics working papers 2005-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2005. "Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need," CEPR Discussion Papers 5242, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  13. Emons, Winand, 1997. "Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1644, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    1. Xavier Freixas & Sjaak Hurkens & Alan D. Morrison & Nir Vulkan, 2007. "Interbank Competition with Costly Screening," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
    2. Xavier Freixas & Sjaak Hurkens & Alan D. Morrison & Nir Vulkan, 2004. "Interbank Comptetition with Costly Screening," Economics Working Papers 802, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods Monopolists," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1060, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Ting, 2006. "Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts," MPRA Paper 1107, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Sep 0007. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2008. "On the use of labels in credence goods markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 237-252, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2003. "Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services," CEPR Discussion Papers 4155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    4. Kyle Hyndman & Saltuk Ozerturk, 2008. "Consumer Information in a Market for Expert Services," Departmental Working Papers 0801, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?," Diskussionsschriften dp0201, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    6. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2001. "On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    7. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven, 2003. "Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market," IDEI Working Papers 165, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    9. Suelzle, Kai & Wambach, Achim, 2002. "Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    10. Anania, Giovanni & Nistico, Rosanna, 2003. "Public Regulation As A Substitute For Trust In Quality Food Markets. What If The Trust Substitute Cannot Be Fully Trusted?," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25924, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
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    11. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision and Competition in Banking," Economics Working Papers 760, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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    12. Heijnen, P., 2007. "Informative advertising by an environmental group," CeNDEF Working Papers 07-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    13. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005. "Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels," Economics working papers 2005-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    14. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005. "Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods," Economics working papers 2005-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    15. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2005. "Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need," CEPR Discussion Papers 5242, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    16. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing," Diskussionsschriften dp0207, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]

  15. Winand Emons, 1994. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts," Diskussionsschriften dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Ting, 2006. "Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts," MPRA Paper 1107, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Sep 0007. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2008. "On the use of labels in credence goods markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 237-252, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2003. "Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services," CEPR Discussion Papers 4155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    4. Kyle Hyndman & Saltuk Ozerturk, 2008. "Consumer Information in a Market for Expert Services," Departmental Working Papers 0801, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers?," Diskussionsschriften dp0201, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    6. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice," Discussion Papers 1306, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Stefanie Kirchhoff, 2000. "Green Business and Blue Angels," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 15(4), pages 403-420, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    9. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Expert Incentives: Cure versus Prevention," Working Papers 07-08, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    10. Michela Limardi, 2008. "International labour standards and product differentiation," PSE Working Papers 2008-58, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    11. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven, 2003. "Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market," IDEI Working Papers 165, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    12. Georg Meran & Reimund Schwarze, 2007. "Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?," Working Papers 2007-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
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    13. Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, 1999. "Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 7112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    14. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, 1998. "Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    15. Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2005. "The Physician-Patient Relationship Revisited - the Patient's View," HEW 0505001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    16. Anania, Giovanni & Nistico, Rosanna, 2003. "Public Regulation As A Substitute For Trust In Quality Food Markets. What If The Trust Substitute Cannot Be Fully Trusted?," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25924, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    17. McCluskey, Jill J., 2000. "A Game Theoretic Approach To Organic Foods: An Analysis Of Asymmetric Information And Policy," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 29(1), April. [Downloadable!]
    18. Evelyn Vezza, 2004. "Poder de Mercado en las Profesiones Autorreguladas: El Desempeño Médico en Argentina," Working Papers 0016, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
    19. Javier Núñez, 2007. "Can self regulation work?: a story of corruption, impunity and cover-up," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 209-233, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    20. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision and Competition in Banking," Economics Working Papers 760, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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    21. Soest, A. van & Bartels, R. & Fiebig, D.G., 2003. "Consumers and experts: an econometric analysis of the demand for water heaters," Discussion Paper 26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    22. Heijnen, P., 2007. "Informative advertising by an environmental group," CeNDEF Working Papers 07-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    23. Arfini, Filippo & Cernicchiaro, Sabrina & Mancini, Maria Cecilia, 2007. "Private Innovation and Public Innovation: Who Leads and Who Follows?," 2007 1st Forum, February 15-17, 2007, Innsbruck, Austria 6587, International European Forum on Innovation and System Dynamics in Food Networks. [Downloadable!]
    24. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005. "Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels," Economics working papers 2005-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    25. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005. "Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods," Economics working papers 2005-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
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    26. Richard G. Frank, 2004. "Behavioral Economics and Health Economics," NBER Working Papers 10881, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    27. Franz Benstetter & Achim Wambach, 2001. "Strategic Interaction in the Market for Physician Services: The Treadmill Effect in a Fixed Budget System," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    28. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," Working Papers 2009-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
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    29. Thomas Liebi, 2002. "Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing," Diskussionsschriften dp0207, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    30. Péter Eso & Balázs Szentes, 2004. "The Price of Advice," Discussion Papers 1416, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Winand Emons, 1993. "Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration," Diskussionsschriften dp9308, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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    1. John McLaren, 2000. ""Globalization" and Vertical Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1239-1254, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  17. Winand Emons, 1993. "The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design," Diskussionsschriften dp9310, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1117, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    4. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in TheControl of Environmental Risk," Working Papers hal-00243027_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Emons,Winand & Sobel,Joel, 1988. "On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical," Discussion Paper Serie A 212, University of Bonn, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    2. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Patrick González, 2004. "Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-58, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    5. Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002. "Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution," Working papers 2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    6. González, Patrick, 2003. "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0305, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
    7. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    8. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    9. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    10. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    11. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," Working Papers 04-17, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    12. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Emons,Winand, 1988. "Efficient liability rules for an economy," Discussion Paper Serie A 213, University of Bonn, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    2. Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, 2003. "Victim or Injurer:Negligence-Based Liability Rules Under Role-Type Uncertainty, With An Extension to Collisions Of Different-Sized Vehicles," Working Papers 2003-17, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Emons,Winand, 1986. "On the limitation of warranty duration," Discussion Paper Serie A 41, University of Bonn, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Kunpeng & Chhajed, Dilip & Mallik, Suman, 2005. "Design of Extended Warranties in Supply Chains," Working Papers 05-0128, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
    2. Aidan Hollis, 1996. "Exclusivity Restrictions in Markets with Adverse Selection: The Case of Extended Warranties," Working Papers ecpap-96-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. David Hakes & Dongsoo Shin, 2008. "Warranties as a device to extract rent from low-risk users of a product," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
    4. Thomas Eger, . "Einige ökonomische Aspekte der Europäischen Verbrauchsgüterkauf - Richtlinie und ihrer Umsetzung in deutsches Recht," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1032, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
    5. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Winand Emons, 2006. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 20-32. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Winand Emons, 2005. "Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-, September.
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  4. Winand Emons, 2004. "Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Emons, Winand, 2003. "A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-259, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Emons, Winand, 2001. "Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 247-68, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Emons, Winand, 2001. "Credence goods monopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Winand Emons, 2000. "Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(3), pages 431-, September.
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  11. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Liqun Liu & Andrew Rettenmaier & Thomas Saving, 2009. "Conditional payments and self-protection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 159-172, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Expert Incentives: Cure versus Prevention," Working Papers 07-08, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385. [Downloadable!]
    6. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

  12. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Emons, Winand, 1996. "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 465-484, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Emons, Winand, 1994. "The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 479-491, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Emons, Winand & Sobel, Joel, 1991. "On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents Are Not Identical," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 375-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Emons, Winand, 1990. "Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 89-104, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    2. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, 2003. "Victim or Injurer:Negligence-Based Liability Rules Under Role-Type Uncertainty, With An Extension to Collisions Of Different-Sized Vehicles," Working Papers 2003-17, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," Working Papers 04-17, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Emons, Winand, 1989. "On the Limitation of Warranty Duration," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(3), pages 287-301, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Emons, Winand, 1989. " The Theory of Warranty Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(1), pages 43-57.

    Cited by:

    1. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. David Hakes & Dongsoo Shin, 2008. "Warranties as a device to extract rent from low-risk users of a product," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
    3. Thomas Eger, . "Einige ökonomische Aspekte der Europäischen Verbrauchsgüterkauf - Richtlinie und ihrer Umsetzung in deutsches Recht," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1032, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]

  19. Emons, Winand, 1988. "Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 16-33, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Nancy A. Lutz & Philip H. Dybvig, 1989. "Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 922, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Li, Kunpeng & Chhajed, Dilip & Mallik, Suman, 2005. "Design of Extended Warranties in Supply Chains," Working Papers 05-0128, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
    3. Aidan Hollis, 1996. "Exclusivity Restrictions in Markets with Adverse Selection: The Case of Extended Warranties," Working Papers ecpap-96-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]

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