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Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information

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Author Info
Tim Friehe ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 97 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 165-183
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:97:y:2009:i:2:p:165-183

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

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Related research
Keywords: Optimal law enforcement; Escalating sanctions; Repeat offender; Imperfect information; K42; H23;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Funk, Patricia, 2004. "On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 715-728, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kenkel, Donald S & Koch, Steven F, 2001. "Deterrence and Knowledge of the Law: The Case of Drunk Driving," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 33(7), pages 845-54, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 89-94. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2005. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1). [Downloadable!]
  5. Lance Lochner, 2003. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," NBER Working Papers 9474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2001. "Optimal punishment when individuals may learn deviant values," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 271-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1991. "A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 291-306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Hu, Sheng-cheng & Huang, Ting-yuan, 2000. "Punishing repeat offenders more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 127-140, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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