This paper investigates whether the contractual exclusion of third-party extended warranties should be legally permissible, using a model incorporating consumer heterogeneity. The welfare effects of competition in the market for extended warranties are shown to depend on the degree of competition in the product market. In contrast to the approach typically adopted by the courts, the paper argues that manufacturers should not generally be permitted to practice requirements contracting in extended warranties, even when the product market is competitive.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
ecpap-96-03.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 12 Jan 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:ecpap-96-03
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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