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Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals

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  • Antony Dnes
  • Neil Rickman

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  • Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:5:y:1998:i:3:p:247-265
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008633700234
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    3. Phillips, Jenny & Hawkins, Keith & Flemming, John S, 1975. "Compensation for Personal Injuries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 85(337), pages 129-134, March.
    4. Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil & Fenn, Paul, 1999. "Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 545-558, July.
    5. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil & McGuire, Alistair, 1994. "Contracts and supply assurance in the UK health care market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 125-144, July.
    6. Emons, Winand, 2001. "Credence goods monopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March.
    7. Gray, Alastair M, 1994. "The Reform of Legal Aid," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 51-67, Spring.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    9. Antony W. Dnes, 1993. "The Scope of Chadwick's Bidding Scheme," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 9301, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.
    2. Deffains, Bruno & Desrieux, Claudine, 2015. "To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 178-189.
    3. Julia Shamir & Noam Shamir, 2021. "Third-party funding in a sequential litigation process," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 169-202, August.

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