Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid
AbstractThis paper considers whether lawyers, acting as agents, respond to financial incentives which are extraneous to their clients' requirements. The authors take, as a case study, lawyers performing legal aid work in England and Wales. An empirical model of legal aid expenditure variations across areas in relation to changes in the demand for conveyancing services and the structure of the industry is estimated using dynamic panel data methods. The results may help to explain rising government legal aid expenditure in recent years. Copyright 1999 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 51 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
- Stephen, Frank H. & Fazio, Giorgio & Tata, Cyrus, 2008. "Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 212-219, September.
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