Price Competition Between an Expert and a Non-Expert
AbstractThis paper characterizes price competition between an expert and a non-expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert’s repair technology is not always successful. Consumers visit the expert after experiencing an unsuccessful match at the non-expert. This re-entry affects the behaviour of both sellers. For low enough probability of successful repair at the non-expert, all consumers first visit the non-expert, and a ‘timid-pricing’ equilibrium results. If the non-expert’s repair technology performs well enough, it pays for some consumers to disregard the non-expert. They directly go to the expert’s shop, and an ‘aggressive-pricing’ equilibrium results. For intermediate values of the non-expert’s successful repair a ‘mixed-pricing’ equilibrium emerges where the expert randomizes over the monopoly price and some lower price.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1905.
Date of creation: Jun 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse, Hans, 2000. "Price competition between an expert and a non-expert," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 901-923, August.
- Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A., 1998. "Price competition between an expert and a non-expert," Discussion Paper 1998-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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