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Point-record driving licence and road safety : an economic approach

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Author Info

  • Jean-Marc Bourgeon

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Pierre Picard

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

Les permis de conduire à points sont aujourd'hui très largement utilisés pour faire respecter les politiques de sécurité routière, avec toutefois des mises en oeuvre diverses selon les pays et parfois à l'intérieur d'un même pays. Comme toute sanction non-monétaire, priver les contrevenants de leur permis permet aux autorités publiques de retirer de la route les individus dangereux et aussi de dissuader les conducteurs normaux d'enfreindre le code de la route. Nous analysons les caractéristiques souhaitables des mécanismes de permis à points et, en particulier, nous étudions s'ils devraient inclure des clauses de récupération des points perdus et des périodes probatoires. Nous envisageons également la possibilité d'un retrait immédiat du permis de conduire pour les infractions les plus graves.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00243024.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Public Economics, 2007, 91, 1-2, 235-258
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00243024

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  1. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
  2. Blackmon, B Glenn, Jr & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1991. "Mispriced Equity: Regulated Rates for Auto Insurance in Massachusetts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 65-69, May.
  3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 823-835, May.
  4. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September.
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  9. Winand Emons, 2001. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  10. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
  11. Landes, Elisabeth M, 1982. "Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 49-65, April.
  12. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "A Model of Optimal Incapacitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 107-10, May.
  13. Sloan, Frank A & Reilly, Bridget A & Schenzler, Christoph, 1995. "Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 49-77, April.
  14. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "A note on the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 245-247, July.
  15. Levitt, Steven D., 1997. "Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 179-192, June.
  16. Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Hu, Sheng-cheng & Huang, Ting-yuan, 2000. "Punishing repeat offenders more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 127-140, March.
  17. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  19. Viscusi, W Kip, 1993. "The Value of Risks to Life and Health," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1912-46, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
  2. Benedettini, Simona & Nicita, Antonio, 2012. "The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 256-270.
  3. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa & Mariatiziana Falcone, 2013. "The deterrent effects of the penalty points system for driving offences: a regression discontinuity approach," Empirical Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 965-985, October.
  4. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet & Denise Desjardins, 2006. "Perception of the Risks Associated with Impaired Driving and Effects on Driving Behavior," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 0608, CIRPEE.
  5. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa & Mariatiziana Falcone, 2010. "The Deterrent Effects of Penalty Point System in Driving Licenses: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," Working Papers, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica) 201004, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica).
  6. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet & Denise Desjardins, 2007. "Predicted risk perception and risk-taking behavior: The case of impaired driving," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 237-264, December.
  7. Antonio Nicita & Simona Benedettini, 2012. "The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena, Department of Economics, University of Siena 631, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  8. Jean Pinquet, 2012. "Experience rating in non-life insurance," Working Papers hal-00677100, HAL.
  9. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 1233, CIRPEE.
  10. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers hal-00243056, HAL.
  11. Marcello Basili & Filippo Belloc & Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2012. "Warning, Learning and Compliance: Evidence from Micro-data on Driving Behavior," Department of Economics University of Siena, Department of Economics, University of Siena 639, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  12. Chandler, Vincent, 2012. "Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System," MPRA Paper 39439, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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