Dynamic law enforcement with learning
AbstractThis paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency’s current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability of future apprehension at a lower marginal cost. We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal fine could be less than maximal and the optimal probability of detection could be higher than otherwise. It is also suggested that the optimal imprisonment sentence could be higher than otherwise.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38480.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
fine; probability of detection and punishment; learning;
Other versions of this item:
- Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 192-206, April.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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