A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders
AbstractA feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employment opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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