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"Selling the store" to the HMO: A life insurance contract for optimal provision of care

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  • Burkey, Mark L.

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  • Burkey, Mark L., 2008. ""Selling the store" to the HMO: A life insurance contract for optimal provision of care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 118-132, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:65:y:2008:i:1:p:118-132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Glied, Sherry & Zivin, Joshua Graff, 2002. "How do doctors behave when some (but not all) of their patients are in managed care?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 337-353, March.
    2. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    3. Emons, Winand, 1988. "Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 16-33, October.
    4. Emons, Winand, 2001. "Credence goods monopolists," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 375-389, March.
    5. Iversen, Tor & Luras, Hilde, 2000. "Economic motives and professional norms: the case of general medical practice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 447-470, December.
    6. Gabriel Picone & Shin-Yi Chou & Frank Sloan, 2002. "Are For-Profit Hospital Conversions Harmful to Patients and to Medicare?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 507-523, Autumn.
    7. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    8. Encinosa, William, 2001. "The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 85-107, January.
    9. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Burkey, 2012. "Decomposing geographic accessibility into component parts: methods and an application to hospitals," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), pages 783-800, June.

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