Strategic vertical integration without foreclosure
AbstractWe determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. We show that vertical merger waves can be expected to stop by themselves before integration is complete. Consequently, vertical foreclosure plays no significant role in this paper that claims for a soft approach of vertical integration by antitrust authorities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 11.
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
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merger waves; vertical integration; vertical foreclosure;
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- Assaf, A. George & Barros, Carlos & Sellers-Rubio, Ricardo, 2011. "Efficiency determinants in retail stores: a Bayesian framework," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 283-292, June.
- Dennis Gaertner & Daniel Halbheer, 2004.
"Are There Waves in Merger Activity After All?,"
SOI - Working Papers
0414, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2006.
- Éric Avenel & Stéphane Caprice, 2012. "Collusion and downstream entry in a vertically integrated industry," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201208, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
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