Self-report to self-control? A note
AbstractThis note establishes that escalating penalty regimes with the option to self-report crimes may allow present-biased offenders to obligate themselves to refrain from committing future crimes. Self-reporting of a committed crime increases the expected costs of future criminal opportunities, possibly allowing offenders to deter their future selves from seeking immediate gratification.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).
Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175
Crime; Escalating penalties; Self-reporting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K - Law and Economics
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