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Reducing crime through expungements

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  • Mungan, Murat C.

Abstract

Expungement refers to the legal practice of having one's criminal record sealed. These legal devices lower the visibility of a person's criminal record, and thereby reduce the informal sanctions that may be imposed on him. This reduction is enjoyed by the ex-convict only if he does not become a repeat offender, because otherwise he re-obtains a criminal record. Thus, the value a person attaches to having his record expunged is inversely related to his criminal tendency. Therefore, by making expungements costly, the criminal justice system can sort out low criminal tendency individuals – who are unlikely to recidivate – from people who have high criminal tendencies. Moreover, the availability of expungements does not substantially affect a first time offender's incentive to commit crime, because one incurs a cost close to the reduction in informal sanctions that he enjoys by sealing his criminal record. On the other hand, expungements increase specific deterrence, because a person who has no visible record suffers informal sanctions if he is convicted a second time. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, allowing ex-convicts to seal their records at substantial costs reduces crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Mungan, Murat C., 2017. "Reducing crime through expungements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 398-409.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:137:y:2017:i:c:p:398-409
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.021
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    Cited by:

    1. Erkmen G. Aslim & Murat C. Mungan & Carlos I. Navarro & Han Yu, 2022. "The Effect of Public Health Insurance on Criminal Recidivism," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(1), pages 45-91, January.
    2. Echazu, Luciana & Nocetti, Diego, 2019. "Understanding risky behaviors during adolescence: A model of self-discovery through experimentation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 12-21.
    3. Lundberg, Alexander, 2019. "Leniency Can Increase Deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Espinosa, Romain & DeAngelo, Gregory & Deffains, Bruno & Mungan, Murat & Romaniuc, Rustam, 2021. "The price of expungements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    5. Honigsberg, Colleen & Jacob, Matthew, 2021. "Deleting misconduct: The expungement of BrokerCheck records," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(3), pages 800-831.
    6. Lundberg, Alexander & Mungan, Murat, 2022. "The effect of evidentiary rules on conviction rates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 563-576.
    7. Murat C. Mungan & Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Legislating for profit and optimal Eighth‐Amendment review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1403-1416, July.

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