Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?
AbstractMany critics believe that since high income criminals can afford to purchase better legal services they are less severely punished than poor criminals who commit equivalent crimes. Others are concerned that the penalties imposed on criminals are "too small." This paper shows that ignoring the effect conviction has on later earnings dramatically underestimates the total monetary penalty paid by those convicted and that the penalty structure is extremely progressive. Where evidence on the probability of conviction is available, it shows that the highest income criminals face the highest expected penalties. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 30 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eric Rasmusen, 1995.
"``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality'',"
Law and Economics
- Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-43, October.
- Rasmusen, E., 1992. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Papers 92-019, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Kobayashi, Bruce H. & Lott, John Jr., 1996. "In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 397-416, December.
- Armstrong, J. Scott & Green, Kesten C., 2013.
"Effects of corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility policies,"
Journal of Business Research,
Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 1922-1927.
- Armstrong, J. Scott & Green, Kesten C., 2012. "Effects of corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility policies," MPRA Paper 43007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Matthew Baker & Niklas J. Westelius, 2009. "Crime, Expectations and The Deterrence Hypothesis," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 425, Hunter College: Department of Economics.
- Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, .
"The Location of Women's Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of 'Harder' Time,"
Claremont Colleges Working Papers
2000-06, Claremont Colleges.
- Bedard, Kelly & Helland, Eric, 2004. "The location of women's prisons and the deterrence effect of "harder" time," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 147-167, June.
- Goodman, John C. & Porter, Philip, 2002. "Is the criminal justice system just?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 25-39, July.
- Jeffrey R. Kling & David Weiman & Bruce Western, 2001. "The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration," Working Papers 829, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Jeffrey R. Kling, 2006.
"Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings,"
NBER Working Papers
12003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey R. Kling, 2004. "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings," Working Papers 873, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Robert E. Hoyt & David B. Mustard & Lars S. Powell, 2005. "The Effectiveness of Insurance Fraud Statutues: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Risk and Insurance 0501001, EconWPA.
- Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
- Levitt, Steven D., 1997. "Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 179-192, June.
- Peter-Jan Engelen, 2006. "An Economic Analysis of the Bekaert NV Insider Trading Case," Working Papers 06-04, Utrecht School of Economics.
- repec:fth:prinin:450 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lars P. Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 651, CESifo Group Munich.
- Peter-Jan Engelen, 2006. "Difficulties in the criminal prosecution of insider tradingâ€”A clinical study of the Bekaert case," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 121-141, September.
- Todd Cherry, 2001. "Financial penalties as an alternative criminal sanction: Evidence from panel data," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(4), pages 450-458, December.
- Mudambi, Ram & Paul, Chris, 2003. "Domestic drug prohibition as a source of foreign institutional instability: an analysis of the multinational extralegal enterprise," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 335-349.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.