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Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?

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  • Lott, John R, Jr
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    Abstract

    Many critics believe that since high income criminals can afford to purchase better legal services they are less severely punished than poor criminals who commit equivalent crimes. Others are concerned that the penalties imposed on criminals are "too small." This paper shows that ignoring the effect conviction has on later earnings dramatically underestimates the total monetary penalty paid by those convicted and that the penalty structure is extremely progressive. Where evidence on the probability of conviction is available, it shows that the highest income criminals face the highest expected penalties. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

    Volume (Year): 30 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 583-608
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    Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:4:p:583-608

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    Cited by:
    1. Jeffrey R. Kling, 2006. "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings," NBER Working Papers 12003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jeffrey R. Kling & David Weiman & Bruce Western, 2001. "The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration," Working Papers 829, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    3. Matthew Baker & Niklas J. Westelius, 2009. "Crime, Expectations and The Deterrence Hypothesis," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 425, Hunter College: Department of Economics.
    4. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality''," Law and Economics 9506001, EconWPA.
    5. Todd Cherry, 2001. "Financial penalties as an alternative criminal sanction: Evidence from panel data," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(4), pages 450-458, December.
    6. Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
    7. Peter-Jan Engelen, 2006. "Difficulties in the criminal prosecution of insider trading—A clinical study of the Bekaert case," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 121-141, September.
    8. Bedard, Kelly & Helland, Eric, 2004. "The location of women's prisons and the deterrence effect of "harder" time," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 147-167, June.
    9. Peter-Jan Engelen, 2006. "An Economic Analysis of the Bekaert NV Insider Trading Case," Working Papers 06-04, Utrecht School of Economics.
    10. repec:fth:prinin:450 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Lars P. Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 651, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Jeffrey R. Kling, 2004. "Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings," Working Papers 873, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    13. Robert E. Hoyt & David B. Mustard & Lars S. Powell, 2005. "The Effectiveness of Insurance Fraud Statutues: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Risk and Insurance 0501001, EconWPA.

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