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Ex Ante Investment, Ex Post Remedies, And Product Liability

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  • Yongmin Chen
  • Xinyu Hua

Abstract

A firm can increase product safety through ex ante investment and can remedy quality problems after sales. An increase in product liability raises returns to ex ante investment through higher consumer demand, but may also negatively affect the investment incentive due to more ex post remedial activities. The trade‐off between these “output” and “substitution” effects can result in an inverted U‐shaped relationship between product liability and ex ante investment. We find that the firm prefers full liability, but consumer surplus can be higher under partial liability. We further identify conditions under which full liability or partial liability is socially optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2012. "Ex Ante Investment, Ex Post Remedies, And Product Liability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(3), pages 845-866, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:3:p:845-866
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00703.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yongmin Chen & Jianpei Li & Jin Zhang, 2022. "Efficient Liability In Expert Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1717-1744, November.
    2. Ping Lin & Tianle Zhang, 2022. "Product liability, multidimensional R&D and innovation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 25-45, June.
    3. Friehe, Tim & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2017. "Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 92-95.
    4. Artigot, Mireia & Ganuza, Juan José & Gomez, Fernando & Penalva, Jose, 2018. "Product liability should reward firm transparency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 160-169.
    5. Yongmin Chen & Xinyu Hua, 2017. "Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 237-267.
    6. Anthony M. Marino, 2021. "Product recall with symmetric uncertainty and multiunit purchases," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 1-21, August.
    7. Christoph Rössler & Tim Friehe, 2020. "Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 295-312, October.
    8. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo.

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