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Miért és mitől védjük a fogyasztókat?. Aszimmetrikus információ és/vagy korlátozott racionalitás
[Asymmetric information and/or bounded rationality: why are consumers protected and from what?]

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  • Vincze, János
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    Abstract

    A szorosabb értelemben vett fogyasztóvédelem szempontjából a hagyományos közgazdaságtan általános ajánlása egyszerű volt: a fogyasztókat minél teljesebben kell informálni, és mivel gyakran ez nem áll a vállalatok érdekében, a kötelező információnyilvánosság eszközeivel szabályozásra is szükség van. A szabályozó feladata annak eldöntése, hogy mely információk számítanak "relevánsnak". A viselkedési közgazdaságtan azonban nemcsak a kevéssé informált, hanem a korlátozottan racionális fogyasztóval is számol. Ezért a fogyasztó megtévesztése közgazdasági elmélet alapján is értelmezhetővé vált. Sőt, a megtévesztés nemcsak hazugságot, félreinformálást jelent ebben a megközelítésben, hanem a fogyasztók kognitív és döntési hibáinak, "irracionális" preferenciáinak tudatos kihasználását is. Emellett az új megközelítés a szabályozói kudarcok új szempontjait veti fel, hiszen a régi elmélet alapján a szabályozási kudarcok oka is csupán a szabályozók információs hiányosságai lehettek. A korlátozott racionalitás a szabályozókra és jogalkalmazókra is érvényes. A tanulmány ezeket a kérdéseket vizsgálja konkrét példákon - elsősorban a fogyasztói hitelezésen és szakértői szolgáltatásokon - keresztül. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D18, L15, I00.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) in its journal Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

    Volume (Year): LVII (2010)
    Issue (Month): 9 ()
    Pages: 725-752

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    Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1189

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