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• Winand Emons

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 21-33
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:21-33

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar, . "Cashing By The Hour: Why Large Lawfirms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1056, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
2. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385. [Downloadable!]
3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
4. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Expert Incentives: Cure versus Prevention," Working Papers 07-08, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Emons, Winand, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.