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Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Hege, U.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Feess, E.

Abstract

The economic analysis of tort law is extended to multi-party accidents with unobservable actions. Due to the requirement of no punitive damages, the problem resembles a team production problem. It is shown that asymmetry in the agents' impact on the stochastic damage function can be exploited to improve ex ante incentives. This implies departures from the proportional rule, based on the statistical information contained in the circumstances of the accident. If a noisy monitoring technology is introduced, then monitoring can add enough stochastic identifiability among injurers to restore efficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Hege, U. & Feess, E., 1998. "Efficient liability rules for multi-party accidents with moral hazard," Other publications TiSEM e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e216300c-126c-4e48-ad1f-20a58f7f94cd
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/286334/hege2.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
    3. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    4. Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December.
    5. Winand Emons & Joel Sobel, 1991. "On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 375-390.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marx, Leslie M. & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Individual accountability in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 260-273, October.
    2. Baumann, Florian & Charreire, Maxime & Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2020. "Market collusion with joint harm and liability sharing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Endres, Alfred & Bertram, Regina, 2006. "The development of care technology under liability law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 503-518, December.
    4. González, Patrick, 2003. "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0305, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    5. Yi Li, 2019. "Apportioning indivisible damage and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 19-42, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law

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