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The Physician-Patient Relationship Revisited - the Patient's View

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Author Info
Udo Schneider (University of Bayreuth)
Volker Ulrich (University of Bayreuth)

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Abstract

The importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond controversy. Most theoretical work is done in a principal-agent framework, dealing with moral hazard problems. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information relationship between physician and patient (double moral hazard). In contrast to most work looking only at the physician's perspectives, our paper concentrates on the patient's view. Estimation results using panel data support the hypotheses that physician consultation and health-relevant behavior are not stochastically independent. This means that health care demand is determined by the patient and not only by the physician. In the recursive bivariate probit model, the patient’s health-relevant behavior has a significant positive influence on the probability of a physician visit. This should be taken into account in the discussion that primary care physicians should function as gatekeepers.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series HEW with number 0505001.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 12 May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwphe:0505001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: physician-patient relationship; health behavior; bivariate probit;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Leonard, K.L. & Zivin, J., 2000. "How To Compensate Physicians When Both Patient and Physician Effort Are Unobservable," Discussion Papers 2000_02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  2. Winand Emons, 1994. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts," Diskussionsschriften dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    Other versions:
  3. Alberto HOLLY & Lucien GARDIOL & Gianfranco DOMENIGHETTI & Brigitte BISIG, 1998. "An Econometric Model of Health Care Utilization and Health Insurance in Switzerland," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9803, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    Other versions:
  4. Silvia Balia & Andrew M Jones, 2005. "Mortality, lifestyle and socio-economic status," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 05/02, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Eddy Van Doorslaer & Andrew M. Jones & Xander Koolman, 2006. "The impact of having supplementary private health insurance on the uses of specialists," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 83-84, pages 10, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Jones, Andrew M., 2000. "Health econometrics," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 265-344 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  13. repec:fth:coluec:9900-01 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Udo Schneider, 2002. "Beidseitige Informationsasymmetrien in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Implikationen für die GKV," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 447-458.
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    Other versions:
  16. William Greene, 2002. "Convenient estimators for the panel probit model: Further results," Working Papers 02-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Udo Schneider, 2004. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard," HEW 0409001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Knapp, Laura Greene & Seaks, Terry G, 1998. "A Hausman Test for a Dummy Variable in Probit," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(5), pages 321-23, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. William Greene, 2004. "Interpreting Estimated Parameters and Measuring Individual Heterogeneity in Random Coefficient Models," Working Papers 04-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  21. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Anthony Scott & Stefanie Schurer & Paul H. Jensen & Peter Sivey, 2009. "The effects of an incentive program on quality of care in diabetes management," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(9), pages 1091-1108. [Downloadable!]
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