The Physician-Patient Relationship Revisited - the Patient's View
AbstractThe importance of the physician-patient relationship for the health care market is beyond controversy. Most theoretical work is done in a principal-agent framework, dealing with moral hazard problems. Recent work emphasizes a two-sided asymmetric information relationship between physician and patient (double moral hazard). In contrast to most work looking only at the physician's perspectives, our paper concentrates on the patient's view. Estimation results using panel data support the hypotheses that physician consultation and health-relevant behavior are not stochastically independent. This means that health care demand is determined by the patient and not only by the physician. In the recursive bivariate probit model, the patient’s health-relevant behavior has a significant positive influence on the probability of a physician visit. This should be taken into account in the discussion that primary care physicians should function as gatekeepers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series HEW with number 0505001.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 12 May 2005
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physician-patient relationship; health behavior; bivariate probit;
Other versions of this item:
- Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2008. "The physician-patient relationship revisited: the patient’s view," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 279-300, December.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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