The physician-patient relationship revisited: the patient’s view
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- Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2005. "The Physician-Patient Relationship Revisited - the Patient's View," HEW 0505001, EconWPA.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Schmid, Andreas, 2007. "Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina," MPRA Paper 23311, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008.
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More about this item
KeywordsPhysician-patient relationship; Health behavior; Bivariate probit panel; I12; C33; D82;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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