Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard
The production of health does not only depend on the medical services supplied by the physi-cian but is also influenced by the patient’s compliance. A model of medical treatment is pre-sented in which both the actions of physician and patient are modeled as a productive input. The analysis distinguishes between three cases of strategic interaction. The consequences of asymmetric information between physician and patient are lower activity levels, only in the case of strategic substitutes the result might change. Furthermore, the effects of the implementation of a demand-side coinsurance are discussed.
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