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Multitasking, Competition and Provider Payment

Listed author(s):
  • Karen Eggleston

    ()

Many important dimensions of quality health care are difficult to observe, monitor, and motivate. This paper examines how competition among providers interacts with payment system incentives when the allocation of provider effort among multiple such dimensions or ‘tasks’ is noncontractible. The framework highlights that an optimal provider payment system, including optimal risk adjustment, should take account of provider multitasking.

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File URL: http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/200101.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Tufts University in its series Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University with number 0101.

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Date of creation: 2001
Handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0101
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  1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  3. Olmstead, Todd & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "The menu-setting problem and subsidized prices: drug formulary illustration," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 523-550, October.
  4. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
  5. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
  6. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
  7. Harold Pollack & Richard Zeckhauser, 1996. "Budgets as Dynamic Gatekeepers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(5), pages 642-658, May.
  8. Frank, Richard G. & Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Measuring adverse selection in managed health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 829-854, November.
  9. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643 Elsevier.
  10. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September.
  11. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
  12. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier.
  13. David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 1999. "Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 351-382, 09.
  14. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
  15. repec:hrv:faseco:30727607 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Selden, Thomas M., 1990. "A model of capitation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 397-409, December.
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