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Budgets as Dynamic Gatekeepers

Author

Listed:
  • Harold Pollack

    (Yale University, Institution for Social & Policy Studies, 89 Trumbull Street, PO Box 208207, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8207)

  • Richard Zeckhauser

    (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

Abstract

Most large organizations allocate resources by means of fixed budgets: each subunit is normally entitled to spend a defined amount over a fixed period, usually one year. Fixed budgets create clear incentives for subunits to control costs. Yet such arrangements create major incentives for dynamic inefficiency, for example by encouraging subunits to exhaust their budgets toward the end of the fiscal year. This paper develops a dynamic optimization model to examine the incentives fostered by budget systems. It invokes the metaphor of physicians involved in a health care delivery system to examine incentives created by decentralized "gatekeeping" as a mechanism to control medical costs. The paper also discusses some methods to reduce the incentives for dynamic inefficiency that fixed budgets create.

Suggested Citation

  • Harold Pollack & Richard Zeckhauser, 1996. "Budgets as Dynamic Gatekeepers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(5), pages 642-658, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:42:y:1996:i:5:p:642-658
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.42.5.642
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    Cited by:

    1. Meissner, Dirk & Shmatko, Natalia, 2017. "“Keep open”: the potential of gatekeepers for the aligning universities to the new Knowledge Triangle," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 191-198.
    2. Stephen Martin & Nigel Rice & Peter Smith, 1997. "Risk and the GP budget holder," Working Papers 153chedp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    3. Raul O. Chao & Stylianos Kavadias & Cheryl Gaimon, 2009. "Revenue Driven Resource Allocation: Funding Authority, Incentives, and New Product Development Portfolio Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(9), pages 1556-1569, September.
    4. Zilla Sinuany-Stern, 2014. "Quadratic model for allocating operational budget in public and nonprofit organizations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 221(1), pages 357-376, October.
    5. Piet Verheyen, 1998. "The Missing Link in Budget Models of Nonprofit Institutions: Two Practical Dutch Applications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(6), pages 787-800, June.
    6. Robert A. Shumsky & Edieal J. Pinker, 2003. "Gatekeepers and Referrals in Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(7), pages 839-856, July.
    7. Karen Eggleston, 2001. "Multitasking, Competition and Provider Payment," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0101, Department of Economics, Tufts University.

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