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Beidseitige Informationsasymmetrien in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Implikationen für die GKV

  • Udo Schneider

Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die Interdependenzen und Informationsstrukturen im Gesundheitswesen. Hauptansatzpunkt ist die beidseitig asymmetrische Information zwischen Arzt und Patient. Der Patient kann i. d. R. weder die Wirkung der Leistungen des Arztes genau einordnen, noch besitzt der Arzt genauere Informationen über das behandlungsbegleitende Verhalten des Patienten. Die Interdependenzen zwischen diesen Handlungen bestimmen das resultierende Gleichgewicht. Die Einführung einer Selbstbeteiligung für den Patienten führt zu einer verbesserten Compliance, das Niveau der medizinischen Leistung hängt von den Interdependenzen ab. Die Implikationen, die sich aus dem Modell ergeben, lassen auf ein Kommunikationsdefizit zwischen Arzt und Patient schließen. Eine Stärkung der Compliance ist zum einen durch verbesserte Information des Arztes, zum anderen durch finanzielle Anreize, insbesondere durch die Einführung einer Selbstbeteiligung, möglich. Die Krankenkassen als ergänzender Sachwalter der Patienten können in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung vor allem Aufgaben wie Vertragsabschlüsse übernehmen, benötigen dazu jedoch mehr Gestaltungsfreiheit.

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Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 71 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 447-458

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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:71-40-6
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  7. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
  8. Vick, Sandra & Scott, Anthony, 1998. "Agency in health care. Examining patients' preferences for attributes of the doctor-patient relationship," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 587-605, October.
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  10. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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