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Ärztliche Leistung und Compliance des Patienten: Der Fall des Double Moral Hazard

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  • Schneider, Urs

Abstract

The relationship between physician and patient has been discussed intensively in the literature. Nevertheless, they neglect the fact that the production of health not only depends on the medical services supplied by the physician but is also influenced by the patient's compliance. We present a model of medical treatment in which both the actions of physician and patient are modelled as a productive input. The consequences of a mutual asymmetric information about these inputs result in lower activity levels. Only in the case of strategic substitutes one level might be above the first-best level. The implementation of a coinsurance on the demand side raises the compliance of the patient. The influence on the amount of medical services depends on the strategic interaction, i.e. whether we face the case of strategic independence, strategic complements or strategic substitutes.

Suggested Citation

  • Schneider, Urs, 1999. "Ärztliche Leistung und Compliance des Patienten: Der Fall des Double Moral Hazard," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 07/1999, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:grewdp:071999
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    Cited by:

    1. Udo Schneider, 2002. "Beidseitige Informationsasymmetrien in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Implikationen für die GKV," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 447-458.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Double Moral Hazard; Komplemente; Substitute;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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