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Der Arzt als Agent des Patienten: Zur Übertragbarkeit der Principal-Agent-Theorie auf die Arzt-Patient-Beziehung

  • Schneider, Udo

The paper presents a principal-agent model to analyse the relationship between physicians and patients. The application of the standard principal-agent model shows some shortcomings of the analysis when being implemented into the field of health economics. Therefore it is necessary to look at the interactions and incentives between the three major players in health care: physicians, patients and sickness funds. The central point is that the key players (physicians, patients and sickness funds) together determine health care expenditure and the stock of health capital. Here, a theoretical model of the physician-patient relationship has to consider further participants as well as their interactions.

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Paper provided by Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics in its series Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere with number 02/1998.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:grewdp:021998
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  1. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
  2. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
  3. Russell Cooper & T.W. Ross, 1984. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 716, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 1," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 3-26, January.
  5. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November.
  6. Levinthal, Daniel, 1988. "A survey of agency models of organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 153-185, March.
  7. Winfried Pohlmeier & Volker Ulrich, 1995. "An Econometric Model of the Two-Part Decisionmaking Process in the Demand for Health Care," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 30(2), pages 339-361.
  8. Martin Gaynor, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy, 1994. "Moral hazard," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 869-903 Elsevier.
  10. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 75-95, May.
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