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Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina

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  • Schmid, Andreas

Abstract

The paper is concerned with the efficient organization of contractual relationships between health insurers and providers. An introduction to relevant aspects of contract theory is followed by their adaptation to the characteristics of the health care system. The focus lies on an ex ante alignment of incentive structures as well as on an efficient handling of conflicts of interest once a contract has been sealed (ex post). The theory based conclusions are contrasted with the situation in North Carolina, USA. Due to the implemented regulation, this state is well suited to serve as a reference. An excursus to the American health care system provides the reader with the necessary background. A discussion of results completes the paper.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23311/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23311.

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Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23311

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Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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Keywords: hospital; insurer; health care system; contract theory; USA;

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