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Market power and contract form: evidence from physician group practices

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Author Info

  • Robert Town

    ()

  • Roger Feldman
  • John Kralewski
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    Abstract

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10754-011-9091-9
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 115-132

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:11:y:2011:i:2:p:115-132

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=106603

    Related research

    Keywords: Physicians; Contracts; Market power; I11; L13; L14;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    2. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
    3. Seldon, Barry J. & Jung, Chulho & Cavazos, Roberto J., 1998. "Market power among physicians in the U.S., 1983-1991," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 799-824.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
    5. H. M. Shefrin & Richard Thaler, 1977. "An Economic Theory of Self-Control," NBER Working Papers 0208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September.
    7. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
    8. Selden, Thomas M., 1990. "A model of capitation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 397-409, December.
    9. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 92, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    10. Gowrisankaran, Gautam & Town, Robert J., 1999. "Estimating the quality of care in hospitals using instrumental variables," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 747-767, December.
    11. Town, Robert & Vistnes, Gregory, 2001. "Hospital competition in HMO networks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 733-753, September.
    12. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1995. "Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 447-51, May.
    13. Christopher Brunt & Gail Jensen, 2010. "Medicare Part B reimbursement and the perceived quality of physician care," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 149-170, June.
    14. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier.
    15. Sandra Decker, 2007. "Medicaid physician fees and the quality of medical care of Medicaid patients in the USA," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 95-112, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert Town, 2014. "The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 19800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Martin Gaynor & Robert J Town, 2012. "Competition in Health Care Markets," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/282, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    3. Dominic Coey, 2013. "Physician Incentives and Treatment Choices in Heart Attack Management," Discussion Papers 12-027, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

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