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Profit or Patients' Health Benefit? Exploring the Heterogeneity in Physician Altruism

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Author Info

  • Godager, Geir

    ()
    (Department of Health Management and Health Economics)

  • Wiesen, Daniel

    ()
    (BonnEconLab, Laboratory for Experimental Economics, University of Bonn and Chair of Quantitative)

Abstract

This paper investigates physician altruism toward patients’ health benefit using behavioral data from the fully incentivized laboratory experiment of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011). This setup identifies both physicians’ profits and patients’ health benefit resulting from medical treatment decisions. We estimate a random utility model applying multinomial logit regression, finding that physicians attach a positive weight on patients’ health benefit. Furthermore, physicians vary substantially in their degree of altruism. Finally, we provide some implications for the design of physician payment schemes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2011:7.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 28 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2011_007

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Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 2307 5309
Fax: 2307 5310
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Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
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Keywords: Payment incentives; Physician altruism; Health Care Quantity;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2012. "Quality competition with profit constraints," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 642-659.
  2. Søren Rud Kristensen & Luigi Siciliani & Matt Sutton, 2014. "Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care," Discussion Papers 14/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Kesternich, Iris & Schumacher, Heiner & Winter, Joachim, 2014. "Professional norms and physician behavior: homo oeconomicus or homo hippocraticus?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 456, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Godager, Geir & Iversen, Tor & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike, 2013. "Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental analysis," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2013:1, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.

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