Paying for performance and motivation crowding out
AbstractWe investigate how prices affect output when publicly-funded providers differ in altruism, and enjoy being perceived as good and not as greedy. A higher price increases output for low and high-altruism providers. Intermediate-altruism providers do not respond or reduce output.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 103 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Altruism Performance Motivation;
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