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Public Hospitals - Incentives and Organization

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Author Info
Rehn, Eric () (Department of Economics, Lund University)
Abstract

This paper presents a novel way to analyze the organization of public hospitals by applying the property rights approach to organizations (PRA) to the problem. It is proposed that while PRA is suitable for the analysis of all hospitals it is especially so for public hospitals.The analysis explores issues concerning privatization and integration of public hospital services. The findings are generally supportive of integration as long as the public principal's human capital is essential for the production of hospital care.

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File URL: http://www.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/Papers/WP07_13.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007:13.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 02 Aug 2007
Date of revision: 01 Apr 2008
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2007_013

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David Edgerton).

Related research
Keywords: Public Hospitals; The Property Rights Approach to Organizations; Joint Production; Integration; Privatization;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jeffrey E. Harris, 1977. "The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 467-482, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    Other versions:
  3. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  4. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May. [Downloadable!]
  6. Robert Gibbons, 2003. "Team theory, garbage cans and real organizations: some history and prospects of economic research on decision-making in organizations," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 753-787, August.
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "The Firm as a Subeconomy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 74-102, April.
  8. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 1-23, April.
  11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ching-To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. David De Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options And The Property Rights Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Eggleston, Karen, 2005. "Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 211-223, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Jack, William, 2005. "Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.
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