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Beidseitige Informationsasymmetrien in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Implikationen für die GKV

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  • Udo Schneider

Abstract

Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die Interdependenzen und Informationsstrukturen im Gesundheitswesen. Hauptansatzpunkt ist die beidseitig asymmetrische Information zwischen Arzt und Patient. Der Patient kann i. d. R. weder die Wirkung der Leistungen des Arztes genau einordnen, noch besitzt der Arzt genauere Informationen über das behandlungsbegleitende Verhalten des Patienten. Die Interdependenzen zwischen diesen Handlungen bestimmen das resultierende Gleichgewicht. Die Einführung einer Selbstbeteiligung für den Patienten führt zu einer verbesserten Compliance, das Niveau der medizinischen Leistung hängt von den Interdependenzen ab. Die Implikationen, die sich aus dem Modell ergeben, lassen auf ein Kommunikationsdefizit zwischen Arzt und Patient schließen. Eine Stärkung der Compliance ist zum einen durch verbesserte Information des Arztes, zum anderen durch finanzielle Anreize, insbesondere durch die Einführung einer Selbstbeteiligung, möglich. Die Krankenkassen als ergänzender Sachwalter der Patienten können in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung vor allem Aufgaben wie Vertragsabschlüsse übernehmen, benötigen dazu jedoch mehr Gestaltungsfreiheit.

Suggested Citation

  • Udo Schneider, 2002. "Beidseitige Informationsasymmetrien in der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Implikationen für die GKV," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 447-458.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:71-40-6
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.71.4.447
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2008. "The physician-patient relationship revisited: the patient’s view," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 279-300, December.
    2. Udo Schneider, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Outcome-based Compensation in Health Care – Theoretical Implications," HEW 0501006, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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